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Notes
THE RELUCTANCE TOWARDS
RETROACTIVITY: THE RETROACTIVE
APPLICATION OF LAWS IN DEATH PENALTY
COLLATERAL REVIEW CASES
I. INTRODUCTION
Laws evolve with the views of society, or more cynically, with the
vote of a new Supreme Court justice. Old laws are changed, followed, or
overruled by every new judicial opinion and with each new bill that is
signed into law. The retroactivity doctrine asks what to do when the law
changes.1 For example, suppose a mentally retarded individual is
1
Retroactivity is a word frequently used by courts but rarely defined. “Retroactive” or
“retrospective” relates to a statute or ruling that extends “in scope or effect to matters that
have occurred in the past.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1318 (7th ed. 1999). According to
some authorities, retrospective laws apply only to civil laws that impair rights or create
new obligations, and ex post facto laws apply to criminal laws that make illegal something
that was legal when the act occurred. See Saint Vincent Hosp. & Health Center, Inc. v. Blue
Cross & Blue Shield of Mont., 862 P.2d 6 (Mont. 1993) (recognizing the distinction between
the two definitions). The difference between the two concepts is usually muddled.
Compare Murphy v. State, 721 S.W.2d 436, 437 (Tex. App. 1986) (describing a “retrospective
criminal law”), and Glover v. State, 474 So.2d 886, 889 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (same), with
In re Rogers’ Estate, 22 N.W.2d 297, 301 (Neb. 1946) (noting that the constitutional
prohibition against passage of ex post facto laws applies only to criminal matters, and thus,
laws that affect civil rights are not within the scope of constitutional prohibition). Modern
courts have basically eliminated all distinctions between the words so that they are now
often used interchangeably.
One contemporary observer noted a further distinction:
On analysis it soon becomes apparent . . . that [retroactivity] is used to
cover at least two distinct concepts. The first, which may be called ‘true
retroactivity’ consists in the application of a new rule of law to an act
or transaction which was completed before the rule was promulgated.
The second concept, which will be referred to as “quasi-retroactivity,”
occurs when a new rule of law is applied to an act or transaction in the
process of completion . . . [T]he foundation of these concepts is the
distinction between completed and pending transactions.
T.C. HARTLEY, THE FOUNDATIONS OF EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW 129 (3d ed. 1994). The
Latin phrase “ex post facto,” which means “after the fact” or “from a thing done
afterward,” is occasionally used as a synonym for retroactivity as well. BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY 601 (7th ed. 1999). Two separate Constitutional provisions relate to the
prohibition of ex post facto laws: “No . . . ex post facto Law shall be passed,” U.S. CONST.
art. I § 9, cl. 1; and “No State shall . . . pass any . . . ex post facto Law,” U.S. CONST. art. I,
§ 10, cl. 1. The classic definition of an ex post facto law can be found in Justice Chase’s
opinion of Calder v. Bull:
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sentenced to death in 1997. Five years later the Supreme Court rules in
Atkins v. Virginia,2 that executing mentally retarded individuals is
unconstitutional. Assuming the mentally retarded individual has not
already been executed, the courts must now decide whether the change
in law should be applied retroactively.3
This Note argues that when the penalty is death a different standard
of retroactivity should apply. If one can accept the premise that the
penalty of death is different from all other penological remedies, it
follows that the way retroactivity is used in capital cases must also be
different.4 However, this currently is not the case. Under current
retroactivity jurisprudence, a new Supreme Court case is rarely applied
retroactively on collateral review, and no distinction is made for
individuals on death row.
A few hypothetical scenarios will
demonstrate the problem, and further explain the hairsplitting
distinctions that are currently made.5
Suppose a criminal defendant is convicted at trial and during the
defendant’s direct appeal, a new Supreme Court opinion is issued that
enhances the protection afforded to criminal defendants. The defendant
now argues that the “change” in law should be available retroactively on
direct appellate review. Under this scenario, the Supreme Court has
consistently stated, since 1987, that the defendant will receive the benefit
1st. Every law that makes an action done before the passing of the law,
and which was innocent when done, criminal; and punishes such
action. 2nd. Every law that aggravates a crime, or makes it greater
than it was, when committed. 3rd. Every law that changes the
punishment, and inflicts a greater punishment, than the law annexed
to the crime, when committed. 4th. Every law that alters the legal
rules of evidence, and receives less, or different, testimony, than the
law required at the time of the commission of the offence, in order to
convict the offender.
Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 390 (1798).
2
536 U.S. 304 (2002).
3
While the Supreme Court has not ruled on the issue, the change in law would be
applied retroactively. See In re Holladay, 331 F.3d 1169, 1173 (11th Cir. 2003) (holding that
there is no question that the new constitutional rule in Atkins is retroactively applicable to
cases on collateral review and citing to many other courts in agreement); infra Part II.A.4.
4
As Justice Brennan eloquently pointed out, “the way in which we choose those who
will die reveals the depth of moral commitment among the living.” McClesky v. Kemp,
481 U.S. 279, 344 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
5
All hypothetical scenarios are purely imaginary and not based on any specific case or
fact pattern. Furthermore, the male pronoun “he” is used throughout this Note to
represent both genders and is not meant to have a discriminatory connotation. This Note
also refers to “justice system” or “system of justice” to include the entire spectrum of
political branches: executive, legislative, and judicial.
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of the change in law retroactively.6 The Court has reasoned that since
the conviction is not yet final, the defendant should receive the benefit of
the change in law.7
Now suppose the defendant’s conviction is final, the direct appellate
process has been exhausted, and the defendant is incarcerated.8 Again, a
new Supreme Court opinion changes the law to announce greater
constitutional rights. The defendant attempts to attack his conviction
through an initial collateral review of the case, such as a petition for writ
of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254.9 Under current Supreme Court
analysis, the use of retroactivity has been severely limited under these
circumstances. While one may think the defendant should be afforded
the benefits of the new law, there are many policy implications that are
present on collateral attacks of a decision that are not present on the
direct review of a decision.10 Thus, the Supreme Court has severely
limited the use of retroactivity in an initial application for collateral
review.11
One final hypothetical is needed to understand the thesis of this
Note. Suppose now a defendant has been convicted of a capital crime
and has exhausted all direct appeals. The defendant has previously filed

6
See infra Part II.A.3. In Griffith v. Kentucky, the Court adopted the standard that cases
on direct review will receive the benefit of a change in law to all cases federal or state that
are not yet final. 479 U.S. 314, 328 (1987).
7
Griffith, 479 U.S. at 323-24.
8
The elimination of the direct appellate review means that attempts to have a decision
reconsidered by bringing the case on appeal to a higher court have been relinquished, thus
making the decision final. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 1, at 1318; see Griffith, 479
U.S. at 328.
9
Collateral review in the criminal context refers to an attack on the correctness of a
decision through either a petition for a federal writ of habeas corpus relief under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2255 if a federal conviction or 28 U.S.C. § 2254 if a state conviction, or possibly under
some other form of a state post-conviction remedy. See Andrew Hammel, Diabolical
Federalism: A Functional Critique and Proposed Reconstruction of Death Penalty Federal Habeas,
39 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 83-99 (2002) (setting forth proposals for habeas reform and
providing a complete fifty state analysis of state laws governing the right to counsel in state
post-conviction proceedings). All fifty states have some form of post-conviction remedy.
Id. While they may be titled differently in different states, a form of post-conviction relief is
generally first sought in state court, and after all state court remedies have been exhausted,
a writ of habeas corpus is sought in federal court. Id. at 3-5. No matter what phraseology
is used or what court the petitioner is in, the convicted inmate is attempting to be released
from prison or given a lower sentence after all direct review appeals have been completed.
10
See infra Part III.A.
11
See infra Part II.A.4.
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for habeas relief to no avail.12 Again, the Supreme Court changes
preexisting law and now allows for greater protection for defendants
facing execution. In a second application for habeas relief the defendant
now argues that the change in law should be applied retroactively.
Unfortunately for the defendant, it is very likely that the change in law
will not be applied retroactively.13 The Supreme Court and Congress
have placed many limitations on second or successive habeas petitions in
order to expedite the execution process. In effect, the government can
now deliberately execute the defendant knowing that the death sentence
was arrived at in a manner that violated his constitutional rights.14 By a
mere accident of timing, the defendant whose conviction is already final
is denied the retroactive application of law, whereas the individual who
was sentenced more recently and is still on direct review is given the
retroactive application of law.
Surprisingly, the Supreme Court and Congress have never
recognized a distinction in applying retroactivity to capital cases.
However, the Supreme Court has consistently noted that “death is
different.”15 The finality and the severity of the penalty of death forces
the criminal justice system to give the death row inmate extra procedural
safeguards to avoid wrongful executions.16 This Note proposes such an
12
This is the distinction between the previous hypothetical and this hypothetical. Filing
a second or successive habeas petition forces the applicant to overcome one of the many
difficult procedural hurdles that were created by AEDPA in an attempt to limit frivolous
habeas appeals. See infra Part II.A.3.
13
See infra Part II.A.4.
14
As Judge Reinhardt rhetorically stated:
Is it possible that prisoners will now be executed by the state solely
because of the happenstance that the Supreme Court recognized the
correctness of their constitutional arguments too late—on a wholly
arbitrary date, rather than when it should have? Will we add to all of
the other arbitrariness infecting our administration of the death
penalty the pure fortuity of when the Supreme Court recognized its
own critical error with respect to the meaning of the Constitution?
Can we justify executing those whose legal efforts had reached a
certain point in our imperfect legal process on the day the Supreme
Court changed its mind, while invalidating the death sentences of
those whose cases were waiting slightly further down the line? . . . A
state’s decision to take the life of a human being, if it can be justified at
all, must rest on a far less arbitrary foundation.
Summerlin v. Stewart, 341 F.3d 1082, 1124-25 (9th Cir. 2003) (Reinhardt, J., concurring).
15
See infra note 133 and accompanying text.
16
As Justice Harlan has warned, “it is far worse to convict an innocent man than to let a
guilty man go free.” In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 372 (1970). However, some prosecutors
would disagree with this proposition. As evidence of this, the following dialogue was
taken from a discussion between an Assistant Attorney General of Missouri and Justice
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exception to the otherwise restrictive use of retroactivity that would
afford an inmate facing death the benefit of a change in the law.17 If
death truly is different, retroactivity in death penalty cases should also
be different.
This Note focuses on the problem of retroactivity in death penalty
cases. Beginning with the common law approach, Part II.A describes the
history of retroactivity from the universal application of retroactivity to
all cases, to the complexities and limitations of retroactivity that have
emerged over the last forty years.18 Part II.B briefly discusses the history
of retroactivity in capital punishment cases.19 With a history of
retroactivity and death penalty jurisprudence in mind, Part III will
examine and evaluate the difficulties with retroactivity by looking at the
many policy implications that a ruling of retroactivity has on the
criminal justice system.20 Part IV will propose ways to circumvent the
general restrictive use of retroactivity in the death penalty context,
including a death penalty exception to the habeas statutes.21 This Note
will attempt to show that the retroactivity doctrine, in its current state, is
inefficient and unjust for inmates facing the penalty of death.
II. BACKGROUND
Retroactivity, through it is early beginnings to its modern
complexity and use in the capital punishment realm, will be the focus of
this section. Part A of this section will trace the history of the
retroactivity doctrine in collateral review cases.22 It describes how, with
the increased use of federal habeas review of state court decisions, the
Supreme Court began to differentiate between direct and collateral
review cases.23 It then discusses how the Teague line of cases and the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”) have further

Stith of the Missouri Supreme Court during oral argument of a death penalty retroactivity
case: “I, therefore, asked the Assistant Attorney General arguing the case, ‘Are you
suggesting, . . . even if we find that Mr. Amrine is actually innocent, he should be
executed?’ The Assistant Attorney General answered: ‘That’s correct, your honor.’” Hon.
Laura Denvir Stith, A Contrast of State and Federal Court Authority to Grant Federal Habeas
Relief, 38 VAL. U. L. REV. 421 (2004) (citations omitted).
17
See infra Part IV.
18
See infra Part II.A.
19
See infra Part II.B.
20
See infra Part III.
21
See infra Part IV.
22
See infra Part II.A.
23
See infra Part II.A.1.
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restricted the use of retroactivity.24 Finally, Part A summarizes how
retroactivity is applied today.25 Part B then narrows the focus to the
issue of retroactivity in the capital punishment realm.26
A. The Evolution of the Retroactivity Doctrine—From Simplicity to
Intellectual Incoherency
The Supreme Court and Congress have significantly narrowed the
scope of the retroactivity doctrine in collateral review cases due in large
part to the compelling policy concerns that the question of retroactivity
creates.27 These competing policies have muddled the consistent use of
retroactivity that was present at common law when all changes were to
be applied retroactively.28 Instead of a coherent doctrine for courts to
follow, the Supreme Court has created a retroactivity jurisprudence that
“has become somewhat chaotic in recent years.”29 All of these factors
combined have resulted in a complex process for determining whether a
law should be applied retroactively.30 This Part discusses the evolution
of retroactivity from its common law roots to its current complexity.
1.

Common Law Simplicity

Under English common law, all new rules were applied retroactively
to individuals on both direct and collateral review.31 According to
Blackstone, the court’s duty was not to “pronounce a new law, but to
maintain and expound the old one.”32 The rationale behind this view
was that a judge did not “create” new law; he merely “discovered” a preSee infra Parts II.A.2 & II.A.3.
See infra Part II.A.4.
26
See infra Part II.B.
27
See infra Part III.
28
See infra Part II.A.1.
29
See Harper v. Va. Dep’t of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86, 113 (1993) (O’Connor, J., dissenting);
see also Christopher S. Strauss, Note, Collateral Damage: How the Supreme Court’s
Retroactivity Doctrine Affects Federal Drug Prisoners’ Apprendi Claims on Collateral Review, 81
N.C. L. REV. 1220, 1222 (2003) (stating that the courts current retroactivity doctrine is an
“unsatisfactory method for adjudicating whether new constitutional sentencing rules will
apply retroactively to federal cases on collateral review”).
30
See Collateral Damage, supra note 29, at 1222. “Over the course of the past thirty-six
years, the Court has grappled with the issue of retroactivity and has crafted a theoretically
incoherent doctrine that has proven difficult to apply.” Id. (footnotes omitted).
31
See Marshall J. Hartman & Jeanette Nyden, Habeas Corpus and the New Federalism After
the Anti-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 30 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 337, 347
(1997) (presenting a general overview of the history of habeas corpus and noting that at
English common law all court decisions applied retroactively).
32
Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 622-23 (1965) (citing 1 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES
69 (15th ed. 1809)).
24
25
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existing law.33 From 1801 until 1965, the Supreme Court applied this
general presumption of retroactivity.34 As the Supreme Court had later
noted, “[b]oth the common law and our own decisions have recognized
a general rule of retrospective effect for the constitutional decisions of
this Court.”35 This approach offered the courts the benefits of a simple
and consistent application of retroactivity. There was no question of
which laws should be retroactive, or whom they would be retroactive to,
because the law was always applied retroactively.
However, with the rise of the legal realist movement, judges became
more comfortable with the fact that they were “creating law” and not
This is commonly referred to as the “declaratory theory.” JOHN CHIPMAN GRAY, THE
NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE LAW 93 (William S. Hein & Co., 2d ed. 1983). In discussing
the numerous definitions of the Law, Gray recognized three general theories of definitions.
The first theory of the nature of Law is that “Law is made up of the commands of the
sovereign.” Id. at 85. The second general theory “is that the courts, in deciding cases, are,
in truth, applying what has previously existed in the common consciousness of the
people.” Id. at 89. The third general definition gives context to the meaning of the cited
quote that judges are discoverers of the Law:
The rules followed by the courts in deciding questions are not the
expression of the State’s commands, nor are they the expression of the
common consciousness of the people, but, although what the judges
rule is the Law, it is putting the cart before the horse to say that the
Law is what the judges rule. The Law, indeed, is identical with the rule
laid down by the judges, but those rules are laid down by the judges
because they are the law, they are not the Law because they are laid
down by the judges; . . . the judges are the discoverers, not the creators, of
the Law.
Id. at 93 (emphasis added).
34
See United States v. Schooner Peggy, 5 U.S. 103 (1801) (mem).
It is in the general truth that the province of an appellate court is only
to inquire whether a judgment, when rendered, was erroneous or not.
But if subsequent to the judgment and before the decision of the
appellate court a law intervenes and positively changes the rule which
governs, the law must be obeyed, or its obligation denied. If the law
be constitutional . . . I know of no court which can contest its
obligation.
Id. at 110.
However, United States v. Schooner Peggy is a civil case and the retroactivity doctrine
has been applied differently in civil and criminal cases. This Note does not attempt to
discuss those differences nor does it discuss retroactivity in civil cases. For further reading
on retroactivity in the civil realm, see generally Debra Lyn Bassett, In the Wake of Schooner
Peggy: Deconstructing Legislative Retroactivity Analysis, 69 U. CIN. L. REV. 453, 501 (2001);
Bradley Scott Shannon, The Retroactive and Prospective Application of Judicial Decisions, 26
HARV. J.L. PUB. POL’Y 811, 815-16 (2003); Kermit Roosevelt, III, A Little Theory Is a Dangerous
Thing: The Myth of Adjudicative Retroactivity, 31 CONN. L. REV. 1075 (1999).
35
Harper v. Va. Dep’t of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86, 94 (1993) (citing Robinson v. Neil, 409
U.S. 505, 507 (1973)) (internal citations omitted).
33
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merely discovering law.36 As such, the difficult problem of how to
retroactively apply a judicial change in law became an increasing
problem in the courts.
The Supreme Court eventually deviated from the common law
approach in 1965 with the decision of Linkletter v. Walker.37 In deciding
whether Mapp v. Ohio38 should be given retroactive effect, the Supreme
Court first noted that the Constitution neither required nor prohibited
the retrospective application of a judicial decision.39 Under this premise,
the Court decided to deviate from the common law approach of
universal retroactivity and instead promulgated a three-pronged

36
As one scholar noted, “[i]n America today, ‘the law means whatever the judges say it
means,’ because of their political power, because of stare decisis, because of judicial review,
and above all because it can not mean anything else according to Legal Realism and its
contemporary heirs.” Richard Stith, Can Practice Do Without Theory? Differing Answers in
Western Legal Education, 4 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 1, 10 (1993). For a well-documented
and informative discussion on the rise of Legal Realism in America see EDWARD A.
PURCELL, JR., THE CRISIS OF DEMOCRATIC THEORY 74-94 (U. Press of Ken. 1973).
37
381 U.S. 618 (1965). In Linkletter, the defendant was convicted of burglary based on
evidence that was obtained during a warrantless search. Id. at 621. After his arrest, the
police took Linkletter to the police station and searched him. Id. In addition, police officers
entered and searched his home and his place of business, and they seized property and
papers without a search warrant. Id. The district court found probable cause incident to
the arrest and held the seizures were valid because the officers had reasonable cause for the
arrest. Id. A year after Linkletter had exhausted his state appeals, the Supreme Court
decided Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), which held that the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment required that State prosecutors could not use evidence that was
seized in violation of the search and seizure provisions of the Fourth Amendment. Id.
Subsequently, Linkletter filed a habeas petition arguing that the retroactive application of
Mapp required a reversal of his conviction. Id. at 621.
38
367 U.S. 643 (1961) (extending the scope of the exclusionary rule to state courts
through selective incorporation of the Fourteenth Amendment). For a discussion on the
numerous controversies of the exclusionary rule and the incorporation of Mapp to state
courts see JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 319-50 (1997); Donald
Dripps, The Case for the Contingent Exclusionary Rule, 38 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1 (2001); William
J. Stuntz, The Virtues and Vices of the Exclusionary Rule, 20 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 443
(1997).
39
Linkletter, 381 U.S. at 629. Although in certain situations, the Constitution does
prohibit the retroactive application of a legislative decision. See, e.g., Collins v.
Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 42 (1990) (holding that the ex post facto clause of the Constitution
is violated in the following situations: if a law is applied retroactively that punishes an act
previously committed, which was innocent when done; if a law makes more burdensome
the punishment for crime after its commission; or if a law deprives an individual of any
defense available under the law in effect when the crime was committed); see supra note 1
for a discussion on ex post facto laws.
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balancing test that would weigh the merits and demerits of each case
and ultimately decide whether a law should be given retroactive effect.40
Under the balancing test, the reviewing court would first consider
“the prior history of the rule in question.”41 Next, the reviewing court
would look at the “purpose and effect” of the law.42 Finally, the
reviewing court would determine “whether retroactive operation will
further or retard its operation.”43 The Linkletter test made no distinction
between final convictions attacked collaterally and convictions
challenged on direct appellate review.44 The Linkletter test applied
equally to both direct and collateral attacks.45
The tripartite Linkletter test survived for twenty-four years,46 but it
was subjected to extensive criticism by courts,47 most notably by Justice

40
Linkletter, 381 U.S. at 629; see also Tehan v. United States ex rel. Shott, 382 U.S. 406
(1965) (reaffirming the Linkletter balancing test).
41
Linkletter, 381 U.S. at 629. The Court set forth the balancing test as follows:
Once the premise is accepted that we are neither required to apply, nor
prohibited from applying, a decision retrospectively, we must then
weigh the merits and demerits in each case by looking to the prior
history of the rule in question, its purpose and effect, and whether
retrospective operation will further or retard its operation.
Id.
42
Id.
43
Id. Justice Clark went on to state the policy reasons behind Linkletter:
Finally, there are interests in the administration of justice and the
integrity of the judicial process to consider. To make the rule of Mapp
retrospective would tax the administration of justice to the utmost.
Hearings would have to be held on the excludability of evidence long
since destroyed, misplaced or deteriorated. If it is excluded, the
witnesses available at the time of the original trial will not be available
or if located their memory will be dimmed. To thus legitimate such an
extraordinary procedural weapon that has no bearing on guilt would
seriously disrupt the administration of justice.
Id. at 637-38.
44
Id.; see supra notes 6-7 and accompanying text.
45
See Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 730 (1966) (holding that Miranda v. Arizona,
384 U.S. 436 (1966), does not apply retroactively on collateral review, and not making a
distinction between direct and collateral review cases).
46
The Supreme Court eventually adopted the standard for retroactivity supported by
Justice Harlan in the seminal case of Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989). See infra Part II.A.2.
47
See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 457 U.S. 537, 544 (1982) (citing Mackey v. United
States, 401 U.S. 667, 676 (1971), and noting that “the subsequent course of Linkletter became
almost as difficult to follow as the tracks made by a beast of prey in search of its intended
victim”); Robinson v. Neil, 409 U.S. 505, 509-11 (1973) (arguing that the Linkletter analysis
was inappropriate, at least when the state had not justifiably relied on prior precedents).
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Harlan in many of his dissenting opinions.48 Justice Harlan, upset that
the Linkletter test created inconsistent results that allowed the court to
pick and choose which cases should receive retroactive effect, advocated
the need for federal courts to have more control over habeas corpus
review and stricter standards for applying new rules retroactively on
collateral review.49 He pointed out that the Linkletter test led to different
treatment for similarly situated defendants.50 He famously proclaimed
that “[r]etroactivity must be rethought.”51
Within the following years Justice Harlan would have his wish.52 In
“rethinking” retroactivity, Justice Harlan differentiated between direct
review and collateral review cases.53 He argued that new procedural due
process rules ought not to apply retroactively on collateral review.54
See, e.g., Mackey, 401 U.S. at 675-702 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). In Mackey, Justice Harlan argued that new constitutional rules should not apply
retroactively to cases on collateral review. Id. at 691-92. However, Justice Harlan
recognized two exceptions in which new rules should have retroactive effect. Id. at 692-93.
The first exception for when new rules could apply retroactively on collateral review is
when new substantive due process rules place “certain kinds of primary, private individual
conduct beyond the power of the criminal law-making authority to proscribe.” Id. at 692.
The second exception for when new rules apply retroactively on collateral review is for
claims of nonobservance of procedures that are “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.”
Id. at 693; Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 256-69 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting)
(identifying two functions of habeas corpus: to protect innocent people from wrongful
convictions and to deter state courts from ignoring or otherwise not vindicating federal
constitutional rights). Harlan argued that courts should only release criminals from jail if
the government has offended constitutional principles. Desist, 394 U.S. at 258. Harlan was
concerned that our judicial system offer an egalitarian approach to retroactivity so that
similarly situated defendants would be granted the same relief, unless there is a principled
reason for acting differently. Id. He argued that picking and choosing what “new” rules of
constitutional law should be applied retroactively would circumvent the function of the
Court to do justice to each litigant on the merits of his own case. Id. at 259. Only if
decisions are based in terms of this egalitarian premise will the decisions properly be
considered the legitimate products of a court of law, rather than the commands of a superlegislature. Id. at 259.
49
Id. at 260-65.
50
Id. at 256-57. Justice Harlan stated that he had joined the Court’s inconsistent
retroactivity opinions in the past only to limit the impact of what he thought were unsound
constitutional decisions according to his understanding of the Constitution. Id. at 258.
51
Id. “I can no longer, however, remain content with the doctrinal confusion that has
characterized our efforts to apply the basic Linkletter principle.” Id.
52
See infra notes 56-60 and accompanying text.
53
Desist, 394 U.S. at 256-62.
54
Id. Harlan noted that:
[A] habeas court encounters difficult and complex problems if it is
required to chart out the proper implications of the governing
precedents at the time of a petitioner’s conviction. One may well argue
that it is of paramount importance to make the ‘choice of law’ problem
48
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However, Justice Harlan did note a few exceptions to this rule if the
procedures are “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty” or addressed
rules that “alter our understanding of the bedrock procedural elements
that must be found to vitiate the fairness of a particular conviction.”55
Justice Harlan’s dissents in Mackey and Desist became the framework by
which the Supreme Court would eventually apply the current version of
the retroactivity doctrine.56
In a series of cases starting with United States v. Johnson57 and Shea v.
Louisiana,58 the Supreme Court slowly adopted parts of Justice Harlan’s
views that new rules should apply retroactively on direct review.59 The
Court adopted Harlan’s view that “unless the rule is so clearly a break
with the past that prior precedents mandate nonretroactivity, a new . . .
rule is to be applied to cases pending on direct review.”60
However, the Court quickly rejected the “clear break” exception for
direct review cases two years later in Griffith v. Kentucky. 61 The Court
stated that “a new rule for the conduct of criminal prosecutions is to be
applied retroactively to all cases, state or federal, pending on direct
on habeas as simple as possible, applying each ‘new’ rule only to those
cases pending at the time it is announced. While this would obviously
be simpler, simplicity would be purchased at the cost of compromising
the principle that a habeas petitioner is to have his case judged by the
constitutional standards dominant at the time of his conviction.
Id. at 268.
55
Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 693-98 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). A substantive change in the law was still to be given retroactive affect.
Id.
56
For a more complete analysis of Justice Harlan’s role in shaping the current
retroactivity doctrine, see A. Christopher Bryant, Retroactive Application of “New Rules” and
the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, 70 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 29-41 (2002).
57
457 U.S. 537, 538-39, 562 (1982) (holding that the decision in Payton v. New York, 445
U.S. 573 (1980), which held that the Fourth Amendment prohibits the police from making a
warrantless and nonconsensual entry into a suspect’s home to make a routine felony arrest,
should be applied to cases that were not yet final at the time the decision was rendered, i.e.,
direct review, except in situations that would be clearly controlled by existing retroactivity
precedent).
58
470 U.S. 51, 52 (1985) (holding that requirements of Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477
(1981), denying the use of a confession obtained by a police interrogation after a request for
an attorney, should be retroactively applied to a case on direct review).
59
See Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314 (1987).
60
Shea, 470 U.S. at 57.
61
479 U.S. at 328 (holding that Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), which held that a
state criminal defendant could establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination based on
the prosecution’s use of peremptory challenges to strike members of the defendant’s race
from the jury venire and that the burden shifted to the prosecution to come forward with a
neutral explanation for those challenges, applied retroactively on direct review).
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review or not yet final, with no exception for cases in which the new rule
constitutes a ‘clear break’ with the past.”62 The Griffith Court had set
forth a clear-cut answer to deciding cases on direct review, but it left
open the question of how to determine cases on collateral review.63 This
difficult question would be addressed two years later in the seminal case
of Teague v. Lane.64
2.

The Teague Analysis

In Teague, an all-white jury convicted a black man after the
prosecutor used all of his peremptory challenges to exclude blacks from
the jury pool.65 Previously in Taylor v. Louisiana,66 the Supreme Court
held that selection of a petit jury from a representative cross-section of
the community was an essential component of the Sixth Amendment
right to a jury trial.67 Instead of reaching the merits of Mr. Teague’s
claim, the Court decided sue sponte to revamp the current retroactivity
analysis.68 In a plurality opinion, Justice O’Connor reasoned that it was
unnecessary to decide whether Taylor should be adopted in this case

Id. at 328. Justice Blackmun stated that “the nature of judicial review requires that we
adjudicate specific cases, and each case usually becomes the vehicle for announcement of a
new rule. But after we have decided a new rule in the case selected, the integrity of judicial
review requires that we apply that rule to all similar cases pending on direct review.” Id. at
322-24.
63
Id.
64
489 U.S. 288 (1989).
65
Id. at 292-93. Teague was convicted by an all-white Illinois jury on three counts of
attempted murder, two counts of armed robbery, and one count of aggravated battery. Id.
at 292. During the voir dire, the prosecutor used all of his peremptory challenges to
exclude blacks. Id. Teague twice moved for a mistrial, arguing that he was entitled to a
jury of his peers. Id. The trial court denied the motions, reasoning that the jury appeared
to be fair. Id. at 293. On appeal, Teague argued that “the prosecutor’s use of peremptory
challenges denied him the right to be tried by a jury that was representative of the
community.” Id.
66
419 U.S. 522, 530 (1975) (holding that the right to a jury trial guaranteed by the Sixth
Amendment requires that a fair cross section of the community is chosen, because the
“purpose of a jury is to guard against the exercise of arbitrary power to make available the
commonsense judgment of the community as a hedge against the overzealous or mistaken
prosecutor and in preference to the professional or perhaps overconditioned or biased
response of a judge”).
67
Id. at 525. The question presented to the Teague Court was whether the Sixth
Amendment fair cross-section requirement should be extended to the petit jury so that petit
juries must actually mirror the community and reflect the various distinctive groups in the
population. Teague, 489 U.S. at 292. A “petit jury” refers to a jury summoned and
empanelled in the trial of a specific case. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 1, at 861.
68
Teague, 489 U.S. at 300. Justice O’Connor noted that the “question of retroactivity with
regard to petitioner’s fair cross section claim has been raised only in an amicus brief.” Id.
62
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because even if it were adopted it would not be applied retroactively.69
In so holding, the Court abandoned the Linkletter test and applied a new
version of retroactivity analysis.70
Justice O’Connor first changed the retroactivity doctrine by stating
that, “[r]etroactivity is properly treated as a threshold question, for, once
a new rule is applied to the defendant in the case announcing the rule,
evenhanded justice requires that it be applied retroactively to all who are
similarly situated.”71 This order of deciding issues was necessary to
avoid advisory opinions and to avoid treating similarly situated habeas
petitioners differently.72 In previous cases, the Court usually reached the
question of retroactivity only when a new rule had been announced.73
Now, according to Teague, the question of retroactivity would be
addressed first.
Next, the Court attempted to articulate a standard for when a
Supreme Court decision would be construed as a “new” rule.74 The
Id. at 299. Justices White and Blackmun filed opinions concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment. Justice Stevens filed an opinion concurring in part and
concurring in judgment, in which Justice Blackmun joined in part. Justice Brennan filed a
dissenting opinion in which Justice Marshall joined.
70
Id. at 301. Justice O’Connor noted that the “approach to retroactivity for cases on
collateral review requires modification.” Id.
71
Id. at 300.
72
Id. at 315-16. In Bowen v. United States, the Court noted a general reluctance to address
the scope of a decision that established a new constitutional doctrine. 422 U.S. 916, 920
(1975). This practice is grounded on the constitutional role of the federal courts. See United
States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 21 (1960) (observing that in the exercise of federal jurisdiction
the court should never attempt to anticipate a question of constitutional law in advance of
the necessity of deciding it and never formulate a rule of constitutional law broader than is
required by the precise facts). For a further discussion on advisory opinions in federal
courts see Phillip M. Kannan, Advisory Opinions by Federal Courts, 32 U. RICH. L. REV. 769
(1998).
73
Teague, 489 U.S. at 300. The Court usually confronted the question of retroactivity
later when a different defendant sought the benefit of that new rule. See, e.g., Brown v.
Louisiana, 447 U.S. 323 (1980); Robinson v. Neil, 409 U.S. 505 (1973); Stovall v. Denno, 388
U.S. 293 (1967). In a few cases, however, the Court addressed the retroactivity question in
the very case announcing the new rule. See, e.g., Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 490
(1972); Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 523 n.22 (1968). In Teague, the Court attempted
to rectify the differing approaches and to clarify how the question of retroactivity should be
resolved for cases on collateral review. Teague, 489 U.S. at 300.
74
Teague, 489 U.S. at 300-11; Marshal J. Hartman, To Be or Not To Be a “New Rule”: The
Non-Retroactivity of Newly Recognized Constitutional Rights After Conviction, 29 CAL. W. L.
REV. 53, 82 (1992) (criticizing the courts use of “new rule” language for retroactivity
purposes and concluding that “capital cases . . . should not be sacrificed upon the altar of
the god of finality for finality’s sake. The evolving standards of decency that mark the
progress of a maturing society demand no less”) (citations omitted).
69
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Court first recognized that defining a “new” rule is not an easy process,
but then stated “in general . . . a case announces a new rule when it
breaks new ground or imposes a new obligation on the States or the
Federal Government [or] . . . if the result was not dictated by precedent
existing at the time the defendant’s conviction became final.”75
Finally, and most importantly, the plurality held that new
constitutional rules of criminal procedure will not be applicable to cases
on collateral review.76 In so holding, the plurality imported Justice
Harlan’s analysis from his dissents in Desist and Mackey nearly
verbatim.77 The Court also recognized Justice Harlan’s two exceptions to
the general bar against retroactivity in collateral review cases.78 The first
was that a new rule should be applied retroactively if it places “certain
kinds of primary, private individual conduct beyond the power of the
criminal law-making authority to proscribe.”79 The second exception
stated that “a new rule should be applied retroactively if it requires the
observance of those procedures that . . . are implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty.”80 The Court modified Harlan’s view of the second
exception slightly by limiting it to “watershed rules of criminal
procedure” that both “alter our understanding of the bedrock procedural
elements that must be found to vitiate the fairness of a particular
conviction” and that “without which the likelihood of an accurate
conviction is seriously diminished.”81
Teague, 489 U.S. at 301.
Id. at 310. This is commonly referred to as the general bar against retroactivity in
collateral review cases. See Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 675 (1971); Ethan Isaac
Jacobs, Note, Is Ring Retroactive?, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1805, 1820-21 (2003).
77
Teague, 489 U.S. at 310. “[W]e now adopt Justice Harlan’s view of retroactivity for
cases on collateral review.” Id.; see supra Part II.A.1.
78
Teague, 489 U.S. at 311; see also supra text accompanying note 55.
79
Teague, 489 U.S. at 311 (citing Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 692 (1971)
(Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
80
Id. (internal citations omitted).
81
Id. at 311, 313. The Teague Court quoted Harlan’s dissent in Mackey:
Typically, it should be the case that any conviction free from federal
constitutional error at the time it became final, will be found, upon
reflection, to have been fundamentally fair and conducted under those
procedures essential to the substance of a full hearing. However, in
some situations it might be that time and growth in social capacity, as
well as judicial perceptions of what we can rightly demand of the
adjudicatory process, will properly alter our understanding of the
bedrock procedural elements that must be found to vitiate the fairness of a
particular conviction. For example, such, in my view, is the case with
the right to counsel at trial now held a necessary condition precedent
to any conviction for a serious crime.
75
76
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Teague significantly changed the structure of how retroactivity
would be applied in habeas proceedings and added amorphous
language to an already slippery doctrine.82 Not surprisingly, the
criminal defense bar and the academic community disfavored Teague.83
The opinion also left several important retroactivity questions
unanswered; specifically, how courts should approach substantive
changes in the law, and how the “new” exceptions are to be applied.
3.

Post-Teague Confusion

Several Supreme Court opinions have added judicial gloss to the
Teague analysis, slightly altering Teague’s core holdings.84 In Bousley v.
United States,85 the Court concluded that Teague only applies to
Id. at 311-12 (emphasis added in Teague) (quoting Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 693
(1971) (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
82
Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., The Rehnquist Revolution in Criminal Procedure, in THE
REHNQUIST COURT: JUDICIAL ACTIVISM ON THE RIGHT 66 (Herman Schwartz ed. 2002)
(noting that the Rehnquist Court has read the retroactive application exception very
narrowly and that many constitutional rights were first recognized on habeas review).
83
For a pointed critique of Teague see Susan Bandes, Taking Justice to Its Logical Extreme:
A Comment on Teague v. Lane, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 2453 (1993). Professor Bandes correctly
notes that “Teague’s self-described goals are to remedy the perceived unfairness inherent in
the former retroactivity test, to do so without thwarting the goal of deterring unreasonable
state court interpretations of federal constitutional law, and to preserve finality of
judgments without unduly burdening fairness and accuracy to the litigant.” Id. at 2454.
She concludes, along with the majority of academic writers, that “Teague fails on all three
counts.” Id.
84
See 2 RANDY HERTZ & JAMES S. LIEBMAN, FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 25.2 at 1042 (4th ed. 2001).
Subject to evident and perplexing shifts in the Court’s definition of
new rules and in its application of the ‘new rule’ concept in particular
cases, and subject to Congress’ codification of a version of the Teague
rule in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
(AEDPA), the Court’s nonretroactivity doctrine as it applies to habeas
corpus cases has remained at about this point since 1989.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
85
523 U.S. 614 (1998). In Bousley, the Petitioner plead guilty to drug possession with
intent to distribute, 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), and to “using” a firearm “during and in relation
to a drug trafficking crime,” 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1), but reserved the right to challenge the
quantity of drugs used in calculating his sentence. Id. at 616. He appealed his sentence and
while his appeal was pending, the Supreme Court decided Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S.
137 (1995), which held that a conviction for using a firearm under § 924(c)(1) requires the
Government to show “active employment of the firearm,” not its mere possession. Id. The
Eighth Circuit rejected petitioner’s argument that Bailey should be applied retroactively
and that his conviction should therefore be vacated. Id. at 617. However, the Supreme
Court held that Teague, by its terms, applies only to procedural rules and is thus
“inapplicable to the situation in which this Court decides the meaning of a criminal statute
enacted by Congress.” Id. at 620.
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procedural rules and not to substantive statutory changes in the law.86
The importance of the distinction between substance and procedure in
the habeas context is rooted in concern for the principal function of
habeas corpus relief, which is to assure that an innocent person will not
stay convicted or incarcerated under a law that is no longer criminal.87
Thus, under this reasoning, determining whether a law is a substantive
or procedural change is a critical point, if not outcome determinative.
Justice Harlan’s two exceptions for a procedural change in
constitutional law could be read as “opening the flood gates” to
retroactivity. However, subsequent Supreme Court decisions decided a
year after Teague quickly tightened the exceptions and significantly
narrowed the use of retroactivity. 88
Congress has had arguably the most significant role in restricting the
use of retroactivity, and habeas corpus in general, by passing the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”).89 The

Id.
Id. Thus, Bousley stands for the proposition that a change in substantive law must be
given retroactive affect. Id.
88
See Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U.S. 227, 229, 244-45 (1990) (holding that to fall under the
second Teague exception (the watershed exception), the new rule must meet the following
two requirements: infringement of the rule must seriously diminish the likelihood of
obtaining an accurate conviction, and the rule must alter the bedrock procedural elements
necessary for the fairness of a proceeding); Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 487-88 (1990)
(holding that a habeas petition would be deemed to rely on a “new rule” under Teague
unless a state court considering the petitioner’s claim at the time his conviction became
final would have felt compelled by existing precedent to conclude that the rule was
required by the Constitution); Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407, 415 (1990) (holding that a
post-conviction case was not applicable retroactively where the legal proposition to be
applied “was susceptible to debate among reasonable minds” at the time the state court
made its determination).
89
Pub. L. No. 104-32, 110 Stat. 1220 (1996) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2000) & 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254 (2000)). For a further analysis on the AEDPA see BRYANT, supra note 56; Randal S.
Jeffrey, Successive Habeas Corpus Petitions and Section 2255 Motions after the Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 84 MARQ. L. REV. 43 (2000); James S. Liebman, An
“Effective Death Penalty”? AEDPA and Error Detection in Capital Cases, 67 BROOK. L. REV. 411
(2001); Mark Tushnet & Larry Yackle, Symbolic Statutes and Real Laws: The Pathologies of the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act and the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 47 DUKE L.J.
1 (1997); Craig Iannini, Note, Circuit Court Interpretations of What Constitutes a Successive
Habeas Corpus Motion Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 7
SUFFOLK J. TRIAL & APP. ADVOC. 55 (2002); Andrea A. Kochan, Note, The Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996: Habeas Corpus Reform?, 52 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP.
L. 399 (1997); Benjamin Robert Ogletree, Comment, The Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act of 1996, Chapter 154: The Key to the Courthouse Door or Slaughterhouse Justice?, 47
CATH. U. L. REV. 603 (1998); Benjamin R. Orye, III, Note, The Failure of Words: Habeas Corpus
86
87
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AEDPA was passed in response to the Oklahoma City bombings90 and in
response to a growing concern of widespread abuses with the habeas
corpus statutes.91 Prior to the adoption of the AEDPA, a habeas
petitioner was without the restriction of a statute of limitations and
without restrictions on the number of habeas petitions an inmate could
bring. Single inmates were known to bring fifty or more separate habeas
petitions, which ultimately put a significant strain on the judiciary.92
However, under the AEDPA there is a one-year statute of limitations for
bringing claims on collateral review.93 There are also significant
Reform, the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, and When a Judgment of Conviction
Becomes Final for the Purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 2255(1), 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 441 (2002).
90
See 142 CONG. REC. 6, 7550 (1996) (statement of Sen. Hatch) (“Habeas corpus reform is
the only substantive provision in this bill that will directly affect the Oklahoma bombing
situation. If those being tried for the bombing are convicted, our habeas corpus reform
language will prevent them from delaying the imposition of their penalties on frivolous
grounds.”); see also Michael B. Slade, Note, Democracy in the Details: A Plea for Substance over
Form in Statutory Interpretation, 37 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 187, 229-31 (2000) (discussing the
relationship between Oklahoma City bombing and the passage of the AEDPA).
91
See H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 104-518, at 111 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 924, 944.
(“This title incorporates reforms to curb the abuse of the statutory writ of habeas corpus,
and to address the acute problems of unnecessary delay and abuse in capital cases.”); see
also Tushnet & Yackle, supra note 89, at 10-20 (discussing political pressures that led to
AEDPA’s passage).
92
See Dorsey v. Gill, 148 F.2d 857, 862 (D.C. Cir. 1945). The court in Dorsey, in discussing
the widespread abuse of the “Great Writ,” noted that petitions for the writ were used not
only to protect unfortunate persons against miscarriages of justice, but also as a device for
harassing the court. Id. According to the court, “[t]he most extreme example is that of a
person who, between July 1939 and April 1944, presented in the District Court 50 petitions
for writs of habeas corpus; another person has presented 27 petitions, a third 24, a fourth
22, a fifth 20.” Id.
93
28 U.S.C. § 2244 (d)(1) (2003) determines the finality of case and is related to §§ 2254 &
2255. The final determination of case determines when the following statute of limitations
runs out.
(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ
of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a
State court. The limitation period shall run from the latest of—
(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of
direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;
(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created
by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United
States is removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing by such
State action;
(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially
recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly
recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to
cases on collateral review; or
(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims
presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due
diligence.
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restrictions on duplicative claims in second or successive habeas
petitions.94 In essence, the AEDPA was an attempt to expedite the
habeas process so that death row inmates would be executed sooner.95
Under the AEDPA, any duplicate habeas corpus claim presented in a
second or successive application is subject to dismissal.96 Further, any
claim that was not presented in a prior application is also subject to
dismissal barring a few exceptions.97 A case will not be dismissed if the
applicant can show either of the following: (1) the claim is based on a
new Supreme Court opinion that was previously unavailable,98 or (2) the
claim is based on new evidence.99 The AEDPA also includes specific
procedural steps requiring an appellate court to certify an application
before the applicant can proceed in district court.100 Combined, these

(2) The time during which a properly filed application for State postconviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent
judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period
of limitation under this subsection.
Id.
Most notably for the purposes of this Note is § 2244(d)(1)(C), which allows a new statute of
limitations to begin when the Supreme Court recognizes a new right that is explicitly made
retroactive on collateral review. See infra Part IV.B.
94
28 U.S.C. § 2244 (b); see infra notes 96-100 and accompanying text.
95
See supra notes 88-91 and accompanying text.
96
28 U.S.C. § 2244 (b)(1). “A claim presented in a second or successive habeas corpus
application under section 2254 that was presented in a prior application shall be
dismissed.” Id.
97
Id. § 2244 (b)(2).
98
Id. § 2244 (b)(2)(A). “The applicant shows that the claim relies on a new rule of
constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court,
that was previously unavailable.” Id. However, this provision was construed narrowly by
Tyler v. Cain, so that a new rule is not made retroactive for purposes of a second or
successive petitions unless the Court specifically holds that a case is retroactive. 533 U.S.
656, 663 (2001).
99
28 U.S.C. § 2244 (b)(2)(B).
(B) (i) the factual predicate for the claim could not have been
discovered previously through the exercise of due diligence; and
(ii) the facts underlying the claim, if proven and viewed in light of the
evidence as a whole, would be sufficient to establish by clear and
convincing evidence that, but for constitutional error, no reasonable
factfinder would have found the applicant guilty of the underlying
offense.
Id.
100
Id. § 2244 (b)(3).
(3) (A) Before a second or successive application permitted by this
section is filed in the district court, the applicant shall move in the
appropriate court of appeals for an order authorizing the district court
to consider the application.
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Congressional limitations on habeas petitions have made the habeas
process much more difficult for potential applicants.101
To make matters worse for a habeas petitioner, the Supreme Court
has construed the retroactivity section of AEDPA very narrowly, making
it even more difficult for second or successive applicants to have a case
reheard.102 In 2001, the Supreme Court attempted to resolve the meaning
of the statutory phrase “made retroactive to cases on collateral review by
the Supreme Court” in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(A).103 In Tyler v. Cain,104 the
defendant argued that the jury instructions used in his case were
unconstitutional pursuant to the Supreme Court’s ruling in Cage v.
Louisiana.105 Some circuits and district court cases had ruled that they
(B) A motion in the court of appeals for an order authorizing the
district court to consider a second or successive application shall be
determined by a three-judge panel of the court of appeals.
(C) The court of appeals may authorize the filing of a second or
successive application only if it determines that the application makes
a prima facie showing that the application satisfies the requirements of
this subsection.
(D) The court of appeals shall grant or deny the authorization to file a
second or successive application not later than 30 days after the filing
of the motion.
(E) The grant or denial of an authorization by a court of appeals to file
a second or successive application shall not be appealable and shall not
be the subject of a petition for rehearing or for a writ of certiorari.
(4) A district court shall dismiss any claim presented in a second or
successive application that the court of appeals has authorized to be
filed unless the applicant shows that the claim satisfies the
requirements of this section.
Id.
101
Orye, supra note 89, at 15-26 (discussing the difficulty of arguing a retroactivity claim);
Jordan Steiker, Restructuring Post-Conviction Review of Federal Constitutional Claims Raised by
State Prisoners: Confronting the New Face of Excessive Proceduralism, 1998 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 315,
324-25 ; Kenneth Williams, The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act: What’s Wrong
with It and How to Fix It, 33 CONN. L. REV. 919, 923 (2001).
102
See infra notes 103-10 and accompanying text.
103
Tyler, 533 U.S. at 663 (interpreting the language of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(A), which has
language identical in part to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244 & 2255, and holding that a new rule is not
made retroactive for purposes of a second or successive petition unless the Court
specifically holds that it is retroactive).
104
Id. at 663.
105
498 U.S. 39 (1990). In Tyler v. Cain, Tyler was convicted of second-degree murder for
killing his 20-day-old daughter, and his conviction was affirmed on appeal. 533 U.S. at 659.
After sentencing, Tyler sought five separate unsuccessful attempts at state post-conviction
relief. Id. He next filed a federal habeas petition, which was unsuccessful as well. Id. In the
interim, the Supreme Court decided Cage v. Louisiana, 498 U.S. 39 (1990), holding that a jury
instruction is unconstitutional if there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury understood it
to allow conviction without proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. Tyler again attempted
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could infer retroactivity on the basis of the holding in Cage.106 However,
the Supreme Court disagreed.107
The Court held that only the Supreme Court, through an explicit
holding to that point, can make a rule retroactive for cases that are
brought on a second or successive habeas petition.108 No combination of
lower court decisions could ever make a second or successive habeas
petition retroactive because the Supreme Court is the only entity that can
make a rule retroactive.109 Thus, according to Tyler, the Supreme Court
must specifically hold a new rule to be retroactive in order for a second
or successive claim to be brought pursuant to the limitations of the
AEDPA.110
While Congress may have changed the limits of retroactivity
through the AEDPA, the Supreme Court in Horn v. Banks111 clarified that
the Teague analysis is still a pertinent question.112 The Court stated that
the AEDPA may have changed the relevant legal principles regarding
the applicability of Teague, but that none of the post-AEDPA cases have
suggested that a writ of habeas corpus should automatically be issued if
a prisoner satisfies the AEDPA standard.113 The Court reasoned that the
AEDPA does not relieve courts from the responsibility of addressing
properly raised Teague arguments.114 Thus, in addition to performing
his post-conviction efforts arguing that the jury instructions in Cage were substantively
identical to the instructions in his case. Id. Ultimately both the district and appellate courts
denied his motion pursuant to AEDPA, and Tyler appealed. Id. at 559-60.
106
Tyler, 533 U.S. at 661. Prior to Tyler, “Courts of Appeals were divided on the question
of whether Cage was ‘made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court,’
as required by 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(A).” Id. Compare Brown v. Lensing, 171 F.3d 1031 (5th
Cir. 1999) (holding that Cage has not been made retroactive by the Supreme Court),
Rodriguez v. Superintendent, 139 F.3d 270 (1st Cir. 1998) (same), and In re Hill, 113 F.3d 181
(11th Cir. 1997) (same), with West v. Vaughn, 204 F.3d 53 (3d Cir. 2000) (holding that Cage
had been made retroactive to cases on collateral review).
107
Tyler, 533 U.S. at 662.
108
Id. A case is not made retroactive by the Supreme Court if the Supreme Court merely
establishes principles of retroactivity and leaves the determination of retroactivity up to the
lower courts. Id. at 663.
109
Id. at 663. Thus, even Supreme Court dictum does not make a rule retroactive. Id. at
663 n.4.
110
Id. at 663.
111
536 U.S. 266 (2002) (per curiam).
112
Horn, 536 U.S. at 266 (per curiam) (summarily reversing a lower court’s ruling in postAEDPA case that Teague analysis was unnecessary and rejecting any possible implication
by a lower court that in a post-AEDPA case a Teague analysis was unnecessary).
113
Id. at 272.
114
Id. “To the contrary, if our post-AEDPA cases suggest anything about AEDPA’s
relationship to Teague, it is that the AEDPA and Teague inquiries are distinct.” Id.
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any analysis required by AEDPA, a federal court considering a habeas
petition must also conduct a threshold Teague analysis when the issue is
properly raised.115 Therefore, the Teague analysis remains a seminal
inquiry in analyzing retroactivity.
The Court has still left several important questions unanswered for
retroactivity analysis. First, the Court has yet to resolve the retroactive
effect on a new statutory change of criminal procedure.116 Also, the
Court has not explained how to handle a new constitutional substantive
change in criminal law or what a change in constitutional substantive
law exactly is.117 Finally, the Court has not set forth a coherent standard
for the relationship of Teague and new criminal rulings that are brought
collaterally under the AEDPA habeas statutes.
4.

The Current Retroactivity Doctrine as Applied Today

There is a strong presumption against retroactivity in collateral
review cases.118 The benefit of a new Supreme Court decision should
always be applied retroactively on direct review.119 If there is a question
of retroactivity, it should be addressed as a threshold matter before a
decision on the merits of a case is given.120 Whether a decision is a
substantive or procedural change of the law is a critical inquiry.121 If
there is a substantive change in a statutory law, the change will be
applied retroactively even on collateral review.122 If the law is merely a
change in criminal procedure, it will not be given retroactive effect on
collateral review unless it satisfies one of two nebulous exceptions.123
The new rule of procedure must either “place certain kinds of
primary, private individual conduct beyond the power of the criminal
law-making authority to proscribe” or be a rule that both “alter[s] our
understanding of the bedrock procedural elements that must be found to
vitiate the fairness of a particular conviction” and that “without which
the likelihood of an accurate conviction is seriously diminished.”124

115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122
123
124

Id. at 272.
See HERTZ & LIEBMAN, supra note 84, at 1031-32.
Id.
See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 86-88 and accompanying text.
See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 79-81 and accompanying text.
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Subsequent Supreme Court decisions have generally construed these
two exceptions narrowly.125
Congress has had an instrumental role in reshaping the retroactivity
doctrine through the AEDPA.126 If an applicant has filed duplicative
claims for habeas relief in federal court the application will be dismissed
unless the claim is based on newly discovered evidence or a specific
holding that a case is to be applied retroactively by the Supreme Court.127
The Teague analysis is still to be treated as a threshold matter on initial
applications and the requirements of AEDPA and Teague are distinct.128
B. Retroactivity in Capital Punishment129
With a general background of the problems and pitfalls that have
plagued the retroactivity doctrine, this Note will now focus on
retroactivity for capital punishment. The Supreme Court tinkering with
death can be traced back at least as far as 1972, with the decision in
Furman v. Georgia.130 In a per curiam decision, the Furman court
effectively placed a moratorium on death sentences by holding capital
punishment, as then practiced, unconstitutional.131 However, the Court
See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
See supra Part II.A.3.
127
See supra notes 96-101 and accompanying text.
128
See supra notes 112-15 and accompanying text.
129
This Note does not attempt to make an exhaustive look at the history or policy issues
behind capital sentencing. For a discussion of the myriad issues that are a part of capital
sentencing see Carol S. Steiker, Things Fall Apart, but the Center Holds: The Supreme Court
and the Death Penalty, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1475 (2002); Bryan A. Stevenson, The Ultimate
Authority on the Ultimate Punishment: The Requisite Role of the Jury in Capital Sentencing, 54
ALA. L. REV. 1091, 1096-104 (2003); Welsh S. White, Fact-Finding and the Death Penalty: The
Scope of a Capital Defendant’s Right to Jury Trial, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 10-11 (1989);
Kenneth Williams, Should Judges Who Oppose Capital Punishment Resign? A Reply to Justice
Scalia, 10 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 317 (2003); Simón Cantarero, Note, Who Makes the Call on
Capital Punishment? How Ring v. Arizona Clarifies the Apprendi Rule and the Implications on
Capital Sentencing, 17 BYU J. PUB. L. 323, 323-27 (2003); John M. Challis, Note, I’m Sorry Your
Honor: You Will Not Decide My Fate Today: The Role of Judges in the Imposition of the Death
Penalty: A Note on Ring v. Arizona, 22 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 521, 522-26 (2003).
130
408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam). Obviously, the problem of crime, punishment, and
just sentencing can be traced back much further than twentieth century America. For a
witty critique of a recent book on this theme see Jeffrey Brauch & Robert Woods, Faith,
Learning and Justice in Alan Dershowitz’s the Genesis of Justice: Toward a Proper Understanding
of the Relationship Between the Bible and Modern Justice, 36 VAL. U. L. REV. 1 (2001).
131
Furman, 408 U.S. at 256-57. In Gregg v. Georgia, the Court explained:
The basic concern of Furman centered on those defendants who were
being condemned to death capriciously and arbitrarily. Under the
procedures before the Court in that case, sentencing authorities were
not directed to give attention to the nature or circumstances of the
125
126
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quickly changed its view only a few years later and upheld the
constitutionality of a reformed capital punishment statute in Gregg v.
Georgia.132
Since Gregg upheld the constitutionality of capital punishment, the
Supreme Court has struggled to determine the extent and role that both
judge and jury play pursuant to the constitutional guarantees of the Sixth
Amendment, Eighth Amendment, and the Fourteenth Amendment’s
Due Process clause. This struggle has been further amplified due to the
emotional and philosophical concerns that the death penalty produces.
As the Supreme Court has often noted “death is different.”133
crime committed or to the character or record of the defendant. Left
unguided, juries imposed the death sentence in a way that could only
be called freakish.
428 U.S. 153, 206 (1976).
132
Gregg, 428 U.S. at 153. In Gregg, the Court held that “the punishment of death does
not invariably violate the Constitution.” Id. at 169. The Court reasoned that “retribution
and deterrence of capital crimes by prospective offenders” coupled with “the
incapacitation of dangerous criminals and the consequent prevention of crimes that they
may otherwise commit in the future” were sufficient reasons to allow the imposition of
death as a penalty. Id. at 183 n.28. Under Georgia’s revised sentencing scheme, a
prerequisite for imposing the death penalty required specific jury findings of aggravating
and mitigating factors such as the circumstances of the crime or the character of the
defendant. Id. at 165-66. The revised sentencing procedures in Gregg focused the jury’s
attention on the particularized characteristics and nature of the crime and the individual
defendant. Id. at 206. The jury was still permitted to consider any aggravating or
mitigating circumstances, but the new statute required the jury to identify at least one
statutory aggravating factor before it could impose the penalty of death. Id. This greatly
channeled the jury’s discretion. Id. at 206-07. The statute also provided that the Georgia
Supreme Court, in addition to considering the legal issues on appeal, would also compare
each capital sentence with the sentences imposed on defendants similarly situated in order
to assure that a jury would avoid a “wanton and freakish imposition of the penalty.” Id. at
223-24.
133
The “death is different” theme pervades Supreme Court death penalty jurisprudence.
See Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 411 (1986) (Marshall, J., plurality opinion) (“In capital
proceedings generally, this Court has demanded that fact-finding procedures aspire to a
heightened standard of reliability. . . . This especial concern is a natural consequence of the
knowledge that execution is the most irremediable and unfathomable of penalties; that
death is different.”); Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 87 (1985) (“In capital cases the finality
of the sentence imposed warrants protections that may or may not be required in other
cases.”); Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 357-58 (1977) (“From the point of view of the
defendant, it is different in both its severity and its finality. From the point of society, the
action of the sovereign in taking the life of one of its citizens also differs dramatically from
any other legitimate state action. It is of vital importance to the defendant and to the
community that any decision to impose the death sentence be, and appear to be, based on
reason rather than caprice or emotion.”); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305
(1976) (“This conclusion rests squarely on the predicate that the penalty of death is
qualitatively different from a sentence of imprisonment, however long. Death, in its
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However, the Supreme Court has failed to recognize a distinction in
applying the retroactivity doctrine in death penalty cases. In 2004, the
Supreme Court was once again faced with an opportunity to apply a
different standard of retroactivity for capital cases with Schriro v.
Summerlin.134
The issue presented in Schriro was whether Ring v. Arizona should be
applied retroactively.135 Previously, the Ninth Circuit held that Ring
finality, differs more from life imprisonment than a 100-year prison term differs from one
of only a year or two. Because of that qualitative difference, there is a corresponding
difference in the need for reliability in the determination that death is the appropriate
punishment in a specific case.”).
Because of the long-standing theme that “death is different” many scholars have
argued for a different burden of proof for death penalty decisions. See Craig M. Bradley, A
(Genuinely) Modest Proposal Concerning the Death Penalty, 72 IND. L.J. 25, 27 (1996) (requiring
the jury “to unanimously conclude that there is no lingering doubt before even proceeding
to the death penalty phase”); Margery Malkin Koosed, Averting Mistaken Executions by
Adopting the Model Penal Code’s Exclusion of Death in the Presence of Lingering Doubt, 21 N. ILL.
U. L. REV. 41, 111-24 (2001) (urging the adoption of a modified version of Model Penal
Code § 210.6(1)(f) “although the evidence suffices to sustain the verdict, it does not
foreclose all doubt respecting the defendant’s guilt” and proposing that the jury certify that
it has found the defendant guilty beyond all doubt at the trial phase); Erik Lillquist,
Recasting Reasonable Doubt: Decision Theory and the Virtues of Variability, 36 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 85 (2002) (proposing a variable reasonable doubt standard that correlates the burden
of proof to the severity of the penalty associated with an alleged crime); Judge Leonard B.
Sand & Danielle L. Rose, Symposium, Proof Beyond All Possible Doubt: Is There a Need for a
Higher Burden of Proof When the Sentence May Be Death?, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1359 (2003).
134
124 S.Ct. 2519 (2004). The following are several good student notes discussing the
circuit split leading up to the Schriro decision: Derek S. Bentsen, Note, Beyond Statutory
Elements: The Substantive Effects of the Right to a Jury Trial on Constitutionally Significant Facts,
90 VA. L. REV. 645 (2004); Ethan Isaac Jacobs, Note, Is Ring Retroactive?, 103 COLUM. L. REV.
1805 (2003); Daren S. Koudele, Note, Unraveling Ring v. Arizona: Balancing Judicial
Sentencing Enhancements with the Sixth Amendment in Capital Punishment Schemes, 106 W. VA.
L. REV. 843 (2004); Sarah C.S. McLaren, Note, Was Death Different Than It Is Now? The
Opportunity Presented to the Supreme Court by Summerlin v. Stewart, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1731
(2004); Tonya G. Newman, Note, Summerlin v. Stewart and Ring Retroactivity, 79 CHI-KENT.
L. REV. 755 (2004). Interestingly enough, all Notes discerned that Ring should be
considered a substantive change in the law and/or should be applied retroactively. This
author agrees with his colleagues despite the Supreme Court ruling to the contrary.
135
Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002). In Ring, a jury convicted the defendant, Timothy
Ring, of first-degree felony murder for his role in a killing committed during the course of
an armed robbery. Id. at 591. Pursuant to the Arizona sentencing statute, a sentencing
hearing was to be heard before the court alone and the judge was to determine the presence
or absence of any enumerated aggravating or mitigating circumstances. Id. at 592. The
same sentencing statute at issue was previously declared constitutional in Walton twelve
years earlier. Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639 (1990). The judge was thus authorized to
sentence the defendant to death only if there was at least one aggravating circumstance and
no mitigating circumstances sufficiently substantial to call for leniency. Ring, 536 U.S. at
593. The trial judge concluded that there were no mitigating factors sufficient to call for a
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should be applied retroactively.136 However, in a 5-4 opinion reversing
the Ninth Circuit, the Supreme Court held that Ring v. Arizona was
properly classified as a procedural, rather than a substantive change in
the law, and thus it should not be applied retroactively.137 Again, a
majority of the court failed to recognize a distinction in applying the
retroactivity doctrine in capital cases.
Justice Breyer’s dissent hinted at applying a different standard for
capital punishment and noted that the law’s commitment to uniformity
is undermined by this decision.138
Is treatment “uniform” when two offenders each have
been sentenced to death through the use of procedures
that we now know violate the Constitution–but one is
allowed to go to his death while the other receives a
new, constitutionally proper sentencing proceeding?
Outside the capital sentencing context, one might
understand the nature of the difference that the word
“finality” implies: One prisoner is already serving a
final sentence, the other’s has not yet begun. But a death
sentence is different in that it seems to be, and it is, an
entirely future event–an event not yet undergone by
either prisoner. And in respect to that event, both
prisoners are, in every important respect, in the same
position.
I understand there is a “finality-based”

reduction in sentencing, but that there were aggravating factors that would allow for a
sentencing enhancement. Id. at 594-95. Ultimately, the Supreme Court overruled this
decision and held that capital defendants are entitled to a jury determination of any fact on
which the legislature conditions an increase in their maximum punishment. Id. at 609. The
Court held that based on the reasoning of Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), a
violation of the Sixth Amendment exists when a trial judge, sitting alone, enhances the
maximum sentence of life in prison by imposing the death penalty because of “aggravating
factors” that are not part of the elements proven for the jury’s guilty verdict. Id. In so
holding, the Court explicitly overruled a significant portion of Walton that was decided
only twelve years earlier. Id.
136
Summerlin v. Stewart, 341 F.3d 1082, 1084 (9th Cir. 2003). The court begins its
discussion of Summerlin with a detailed summary of the unusual circumstances behind this
case: “It is the raw material from which legal fiction is forged: A vicious murder, an
anonymous psychic tip, a romantic encounter that jeopardized a plea agreement, an
allegedly incompetent defense, and a death sentence imposed by a purportedly drugaddled judge.” Id.
137
Schriro, 124 S. Ct. at 2523-27.
138
Id. at 2529.
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difference. But given the dramatically different nature
of death, that difference diminishes in importance.139
However, the majority’s opinion did not find this reasoning persuasive
enough to apply a different standard of retroactivity in capital cases.
Thus, retroactivity continues to be treated the same in both capital cases
and noncapital cases.
III. ANALYZING THE CURRENT RETROACTIVITY DOCTRINE
Part III of this Note looks at the various reasons why retroactivity
has been such a difficult problem for courts. In determining the proper
scope of retroactivity, courts must weigh the rights of the individual
defendant to have his case reheard with the effect the decision will have
on subsequent cases, the finality of a decision, and special problems with
federalism.140 After considering the policy questions, this Part then goes
on to discuss the difficulties with creating a coherent retroactivity
doctrine.141
A. Policy Concerns Underlying the General Bar Against Retroactivity in
Collateral Review Cases
Ultimately, the underling policy concerns are what have made the
question of retroactivity so difficult for the courts. When a closer look is
taken, the problem of retroactivity really becomes the problem of habeas
review.142 Habeas review, while guaranteed by the Constitution, is often
viewed with disfavor by courts.143 Multiple reviews of the same case
139
Id. Justice Breyer continues by stating that an ordinary citizen would not comprehend
the difference: “That citizen will simply witness two individuals, both sentenced through
the use of unconstitutional procedures, one individual going to his death, the other saved,
all through an accident of timing.” Id.
140
See supra Part II. As seen in Part II, the Supreme Court and Congress have tipped the
scales in favor of preserving the finality of judgments and effectively limited the universal
use of retroactivity that was present at common law.
141
See infra Part III.B.
142
See Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 701-02 (1971). Justice Harlan noted that “the
problem of retroactivity is in truth none other than one of resettling the limits of the reach
of the Great Writ, which under the recent decisions of this Court has been given almost
boundless sweep.” Id.; see also Roosevelt, supra note 34, at 1113. Professor Roosevelt argues
that “[t]he AEDPA is a clear example of the shortcomings of trying to fix a retroactivity
problem by modifying habeas.” Roosevelt, supra note 34, at 1113.
143
Justice Powell was vocal in his disapproval of the abuse of the Great Writ. He stated
that “[f]ederal courts should not continue to tolerate–even in capital cases–this type of
abuse of the writ of habeas corpus.” Woodard v. Hutchins, 464 U.S. 377, 380 (1984)
(Powell, J., concurring). He called for legislation, pre-AEDPA, to limit successive petitions
because the availability “of unlimited federal collateral review to guilty defendants

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol39/iss2/6

Doherty: The Reluctance Towards Retroactivity: The Retroactive Applicatio

2004]

Reluctance Towards Retroactivity

471

becomes an inefficient use of scarce judicial resources.144 It is one thing
to use the “Great Writ” for the vindication of an innocent defendant; it is
quite another to have an inmate file fifty or more frivolous pro se
petitions on the hope that one petition will stick.145 This was one of the
main reasons why Congress attempted to limit the number of habeas
petitions that inmates could bring and why there is such a short statute
of limitations for those claims.146 Several other interrelated policy
questions underlie the Supreme Court’s restrictive use of retroactivity
including: concerns over erroneous execution, maintaining the finality of
judgments, judicial efficiency and the cost of change, and comity and
federalism concerns.147 This Note argues that although these policy
concerns are important, when the penalty is death, greater flexibility
should be given to the incarcerated individual so that he should have the
opportunity to apply a new law retroactively on collateral review.
1.

Finality v. Increasing Procedural Safeguards

The value of finality is arguably the most significant and legitimate
policy behind the restrictions on applying new constitutional rules to
collateral review.148 The Court has consistently noted that “the past
cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration.”149 “Finality
serves society’s interest in the certainty that once a conviction of guilt has
been rendered under constitutionally fair procedures, that verdict will be

frustrates the State’s legitimate interest in deterring crime.” Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S.
436, 452 (1986) (plurality opinion) (Powell, J., joined by Burger, C.J., and Rehnquist &
O’Connor, JJ.).
144
Not only are multiple reviews of the same case a waste of economic resources, but it
wastes “all of the intellectual, moral, and political resources involved in the legal system.”
Paul M. Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners, 76 HARV.
L. REV. 441, 451 (1963).
145
Dorsey v. Gill, 148 F.2d 857, 862 (D.C. Cir. 1945); see supra notes 91-92 and
accompanying text.
146
See supra Part II.A.3.
147
See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 436 (2000) (stating that there is no doubt that
Congress intended AEDPA to advance the principles of comity, finality, and federalism);
Stringer v. Black, 503 U.S. 222, 228 (1992) (noting that interests in finality, predictability,
and comity underlie the retroactivity jurisprudence).
148
Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 691 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring in the
judgment in part and dissenting in part) (“No one, not criminal defendants, not the judicial
system, not society as a whole is benefited by a judgment providing a man shall tentatively
go to jail today, but tomorrow and every day thereafter his continued incarceration shall be
subject to fresh litigation.”).
149
Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 308 (1989); Chicot County Drainage Dist. v. Baxter State
Bank, 308 U.S. 371, 374 (1940).
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left untouched.”150 The Linkletter Court argued that finality insures
integrity in the judicial process.151 By maintaining the finality of
decisions, courts also preserve judicial resources.152 However, the
societal goal of maintaining the finality of a decision will forever be in
constant tension with the goal of an appropriate sentence for the
individual defendant and avoiding erroneous executions.
In capital cases, finality concerns must give way to the risk of an
erroneous execution.153 According to one study, over the past ten years
there has been an average of five wrongfully convicted innocent inmates
released per year.154 The Supreme Court has often recognized that factfinding procedures must aspire to a heightened standard of reliability
when the penalty is death.155 It seems only logical that our justice system
should also extend these heightened standards of reliability to the habeas
context and allow for numerous petitions for death row inmates when a

150
Strauss, supra note 29, at 1253. Justice Clark went on to state the policy reasons behind
Linkletter:
Finally, there are interests in the administration of justice and the
integrity of the judicial process to consider. To make the rule of Mapp
retrospective would tax the administration of justice to the utmost.
Hearings would have to be held on the excludability of evidence long
since destroyed, misplaced or deteriorated. If it is excluded, the
witnesses available at the time of the original trial will not be available
or if located their memory will be dimmed.
Linkletter, 381 U.S. at 637-38.
151
See supra notes 36-47 and accompanying text. Referring to the retroactivity doctrine,
the Court argued that to “legitimate such an extraordinary procedural weapon that has no
bearing on guilt would seriously disrupt the administration of justice.” Linkletter, 381 U.S.
at 638.
152
See infra Part III.A.2. The Arizona Supreme court noted:
Arizona has approximately ninety prisoners on death row whose cases
have become final and who received a sentence based upon the
aggravating circumstances found by the trial judge and affirmed on
appeal.
Conducting new sentencing hearings, many requiring
witnesses no longer available, would impose a substantial and
unjustified burden on Arizona’s administration of justice.
State v. Towery, 64 P.3d 828, 840 (Ariz. 2003).
153
The Supreme Court has recognized that “[t]he need for treating each defendant in a
capital case with that degree of respect due the uniqueness of the individual is far more
important than in noncapital cases.” Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 605 (1978).
154
See Death Penalty Info. Ctr., Innocence and the Death Penalty, at
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/innoc.html (last visited Oct. 10, 2004).
155
Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 411 (1986) (plurality opinion). The Court reasoned
that these heightened standards are “a natural consequence of the knowledge that
execution is the most irremediable and unfathomable of penalties; that death is different.”
Id.
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claim is based on a retroactive change in the law. This would inevitably
secure greater protection against wrongful convictions and executions.
As a simple addition to the procedural safeguards already in place,
courts, by using a less restrictive standard for collateral attacks when the
penalty is death, could easily add another procedural safeguard to avoid
the risk of an erroneous execution.156 This increased safeguard would
heighten the standard of reliability, and could change the outcome of
whether an individual is sentenced to death or not.157
Unfortunately, because of the distrust for and abuses of the “Great
Writ” in the judicial branch, and Congress succumbing to the political
pressures following the Oklahoma City bombing under which the
AEDPA was enacted, finality in sentencing has so far trumped
increasing procedural safeguards that the consistent use of retroactivity
could bring.158 It must be conceded that maintaining the finality of a
decision is a necessary component to a functioning criminal justice
system. However, death is the ultimate finality and thus more
procedural safeguards are needed. In essence, “death is different.”159
2.

Judicial Economics and the Costs of Change

Another significant reason behind the very selective and restrictive
use of retroactivity has been the potential strain on judicial resources.160
Critics argue that the retroactivity doctrine creates an unnecessary strain
on society. The economic strain includes judicial and prosecutorial
resources spent on a retrial of the case, and the societal costs may include
“the miscarriage of justice that occurs when a guilty offender is set free

In fact, some scholars have argued that there is a professional obligation to raise what
would normally be frivolous collateral attacks when the penalty is death. See Monroe H.
Freedman, The Professional Obligation to Raise Frivolous Issues in Death Penalty Cases, 31
HOFSTRA L. REV. 1167, 1180 n.88 (2003) (discussing the frequency of precedent being
overturned through the zealous advocacy of persistent attorneys and concluding that there
is a professional obligation to raise frivolous issues in death penalty cases).
157
Ford, 477 U.S. at 411. Justice Kennedy has observed that “[a]ll of our Eighth
Amendment jurisprudence concerning capital sentencing is directed toward the
enhancement of reliability and accuracy in some sense.” Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U.S. 227, 243
(1990).
158
See supra notes 90-91 and accompanying text.
159
See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
160
But see Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 464 (1970) (noting that in criminal cases, finality
and conservation of private, public and judicial resources are of lesser value than in civil
litigation).
156
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only because effective retrial is impossible years after the offense.”161
Each time a new law is given retroactive effect, courts are flooded with
habeas petitions by inmates trying to take advantage of the newly
announced rule.162 Justice O’Connor noted in her Ring dissent that there
was a seventy-seven percent increase in the number of second or
successive habeas corpus petitions filed in federal courts in 2001, largely
due to the Apprendi decision.163
The limited use of retroactivity is also necessary for the development
of constitutional law.164 The Supreme Court is obviously reluctant to
announce decisions that provide for greater protection of criminal
procedure, which would create a substantial strain on the judiciary.165
By allowing the retroactive application of all decisions, the cost of change
would be very significant.
Miranda v. Arizona166 provides an excellent example.167 Presumably,
the Supreme Court would not have required Miranda warnings if doing
so meant that every confessed criminal then in custody had to be set free
or given an opportunity to attack his conviction on collateral review.168
Miranda depended on the limited use of retroactivity, thus allowing the
161
Hankerson v. North Carolina, 432 U.S. 233, 247 (1977). It is arguable whether a retrial
would always be necessary; perhaps a jury hearing on re-sentencing could be completed as
an alternative for a complete retrial.
162
Ring, 536 U.S. at 619 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O’Connor noted that Apprendi
created a drastic increase in the workload of an already overworked judiciary. Id. at 620;
see also Paul J. Heald, Retroactivity, Capital Sentencing, and the Jurisdictional Contours of Habeas
Corpus, 42 ALA. L. REV. 1273 (1991).
163
Ring, 536 U.S. at 620 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
164
Arguably the Warren Court purposely restricted retroactivity in order to increase the
number of constitutional protections. See Roosevelt, supra note 33, at 1114-26.
165
Id.
166
384 U.S. 436 (1966).
167
Nearly every individual has heard of the Miranda warning and perhaps has it
memorized. Here is an example of a Miranda warning used by the FBI:
Before we ask you any questions, you must understand your rights.
You have the right to remain silent. Anything you say can be used
against you in court. You have the right to talk to a lawyer for advice
before we ask you any questions and to have a lawyer with you during
questioning. If you cannot afford a lawyer, one will be appointed for
you before any questioning if you wish. If you decide to answer
questions now without a lawyer present, you will still have the right to
stop answering at any time. You also have the right to stop answering
at any time until you talk to a lawyer.
Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S. 195, 202 n.4 (1989).
168
John C. Jeffries, Jr., The Right-Remedy Gap in Constitutional Law, 109 YALE L.J. 87, 98
(1999).

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol39/iss2/6

Doherty: The Reluctance Towards Retroactivity: The Retroactive Applicatio

2004]

Reluctance Towards Retroactivity

475

Court to give effect to new requirements only in future applications.169
Justice Harlan recognized that limited retroactivity facilitated “long
overdue reforms, which otherwise could not be practicably
effectuated.”170 Without changes in constitutional law, there would be
little need for the retroactivity doctrine, and without the restrictive use of
the retroactivity doctrine, there would be much fewer changes in
constitutional law.
However, the number of individuals on death row is minimal
compared to the total number of incarcerated individuals.171 The
retroactivity of Ring v. Arizona provides a good microcosm of the issue.
Justice O’Connor noted in her Ring dissent that a retroactive ruling of
Ring would only have the possibility of affecting approximately 168
prisoners nationwide on death row.172 With such a small number of
inmates affected compared to the total prisoner population, it is difficult
to argue that the costs of re-sentencing would outweigh the possible
harm caused by improperly executing a defendant. Thus, although the
limited use of retroactivity is necessary for an expansion of constitutional
liberties, when the resulting harm has the possibility of being so great
and the cost so little, there should be an exception for the expansion of
retroactivity in capital cases.
3.

Federalism and Judicial Comity Concerns

Also lying in the background of the recent restrictions on the
retroactivity doctrine are the political underpinnings of a rise in
federalism and the general notion of judicial comity.173 The nature of
habeas review often requires a federal court to review a state court
decision for perceived constitutional violations.174 This initially may
Id. at 98-99.
Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 676 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (quoting Jenkins v. Delaware, 395 U.S. 213, 218 (1969)).
171
As of October 1, 2003, there are currently 3,504 individuals on death row. See Death
Penalty Info. Ctr., Innocence and the Death Penalty, at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org
(last visited Oct. 10, 2004). In the last twenty-five years, the death row population has
increased six-fold. Id. Conversely, the overall prison population is much higher. At the
beginning of 2004, the overall state and federal prisoner population was estimated to be at
1.4 million, which is an increase from 400,000 inmates in 1984. See Marcia G. Shein &
Matthew Doherty, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines: A Troubling Historical Prospective, 51
FED. LAWYER 30 (2004).
172
Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 620 (2002) (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
173
Judicial comity refers to the “respect a court of one state or jurisdiction shows to
another state or jurisdiction in giving effect to the other’s laws and judicial decisions.”
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 1, at 262.
174
See 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2003); supra note 9 and accompanying text.
169
170
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raise questions of federalism and judicial comity; however, the concerns
are amplified when there is a retroactivity question involved.
State courts cannot always anticipate or comply with the Supreme
Court’s changing due process requirements.175 Thus, when a new rule is
announced that is to be applied retroactively, federal courts would have
to overrule an otherwise correct state court decision and force the state
court to retry the case or allow the individual to go free.176
The Rehnquist Court has adopted a restrictive use of retroactivity
based on these federalism concerns.177 Teague seemed to suggest this
interest in federalism noting that “[s]tate courts are understandably
frustrated when they faithfully apply existing constitutional law only to
have a federal court discover, during a [habeas] proceeding, new
constitutional commands.”178 Justice O’Connor, a former state legislator
and state supreme court Judge, has expressed a strong belief in the need
for judicial protection of state governments.179 O’Connor noted that
“[t]here is no reason to assume that state court judges cannot and will
not provide a ‘hospitable forum’ in litigating federal constitutional
questions.”180 However, it is somewhat naive to think that all states will
want to place the extra burden on their judiciary to review cases that are
already final.181

Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 534 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring).
Solem v. Stumes, 465 U.S. 638, 654 (1984) (Powell, J., concurring) (“The costs imposed
upon the State by retroactive application of new rules of constitutional law on habeas
corpus . . . generally far outweigh the benefits of this application.”).
177
While one can debate this policy, it seems obvious from all contemporary observers
that it has been the courts primary policy concern. See Richard Brust, Reviewing Rehnquist,
89 A.B.A. J. 42 (2003). But see Nev. Dept. of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (2003)
(Rehnquist, J.) (holding that Congress may abrogate states Eleventh Amendment immunity
in federal court and hinting that the Court is not completely blinded by a federalism
agenda); David L. Hudson Jr., Court Surprises with Family Leave Act Ruling: Rehnquist
Opinion Marks Exception in Trend Toward Empowering States, 2 No. 21 A.B.A. J. E-REPORT 2
(2003).
178
Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 310 (1989) (citing Engle v. Issac, 456 U.S. 107, 128 (1982)).
179
Erwin Chemerinsky, Justice O’Connor and Federalism, 32 MCGEORGE L. REV. 877, 877-79
(2001); Sandra Day O’Connor, Trends in the Relationship Between the Federal and State Courts
from the Perspective of a State Court Judge, 22 WM. & MARY L. REV. 801 (1981).
180
O’Connor, supra note 179, at 813. Little imagination is needed to show that this
conclusion could indeed be faulty. One needs only to look back fifty years ago when
southern states were reluctant to force integration of schools after Brown v. Board of
Education, 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
181
State v. Towery, 64 P.3d 828, 835 (Ariz. 2003). “Conducting new sentencing hearings,
many requiring witnesses no longer available, would impose a substantial and unjustified
burden on Arizona’s administration of justice.” Id.
175
176
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Even if state supreme courts allow for an expanding version of
Teague so that more collateral review cases receive the benefit of a
retroactive application of the law, this analysis does not mean every state
will retroactively apply a new Supreme Court decision; thus, inmates
will be forced to rely on the whim of a state court decision.182 There are
many disincentives for state courts to retroactively apply a new decision,
such as the costs in re-litigating old cases, budget shortfalls, and the
possibility of an elected judiciary receiving negative political
consequences for retrying a well-publicized case or issue.183 Some may
also argue that state courts may be biased to certain individuals.
However, with federal intervention, a consistent application of a
changing due process clause will ensure every state case has an
appropriate forum in which to be heard. Furthermore, by limiting the
use of retroactivity solely to capital cases, the important concerns of
expanding civil liberties and ensuring proper respect for states’ rights
will be maintained.
B. The Problem of a Coherent Capital Punishment Retroactivity Doctrine
Since Linkletter first started the Supreme Court’s tinkering with the
common law version of retroactivity, courts have been struggling with
articulating a coherent retroactivity doctrine.184 An easy but impractical
solution would be to return to the common law and apply all new
decisions retroactively. This solution would alleviate the uncertainty
that results when a “new rule” is handed down by the Supreme Court

182
For an excellent discussion of why state courts should provide for greater
constitutional protection in retroactivity cases, see Stith, supra note 16, at 421; Tomorrow’s
Issues in State Constitutional Law, 38 VAL. U. L. REV. 577, 618 (2004) (transcript of panel
discussion) [hereinafter Tomorrow’s News]. In discussing the reason behind state courts
reluctance toward applying a different standard of retroactivity, Judge Stith stated at a
symposium on state constitutional law:
[T]he reason that the federal courts are not offering more review is
they want to defer to state courts, . . . people say the federal courts just
interfere too much with state courts and they should back off. So
[federal courts] are backing off, and the state courts are following them
backwards. So this is the state courts’ opportunity to step forward.
They can step forward in many different ways. There’s no right way
or wrong way to step forward, but I think the first step is to recognize
that in many of these areas, they can act.
Tomorrow’s News, supra, at 618.
183
This is one of the traditional arguments why an unelected judiciary is perhaps
superior to a judiciary that is appointed.
184
See Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965); see also supra Part II.A.
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and would treat all similarly situated defendants equally.185 However,
this solution is simply impossible for the courts to implement.186 The
problems of habeas review again resurface.187 If the courts were to apply
a “new rule” retroactively in every case, federal courts would be
overwhelmed with irrelevant lawsuits that taxpayers would have to pay
to defend. States would be disgruntled to have to re-litigate a decision
that is overturned by a federal court based on a previously unknown
“new” constitutional violation.188
Thus, the Supreme Court and
Congress have created a general bar against retroactivity in order to
effectuate a greater expansion of constitutional rights, while at the same
time limiting the policy problems discussed above.
Unfortunately, by limiting the use of retroactivity, the courts have
eliminated a necessary procedural safeguard that would help ensure
accurate convictions. While there are no easy answers to this difficult
problem, this Note proposes a few solutions that would expand the use
of retroactivity in death penalty cases.

185
See supra Part II.A. Thus, the new rule distinctions would be eliminated and all cases
would be granted the retroactivity application of a new law.
186
See supra Part II.A.1 & 2.
187
See supra Part III.A.
188
Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 310 (1989) (citing Engle v. Isacc, 456 U.S. 107, 128 (1982)).
“State courts are understandably frustrated when they faithfully apply existing
constitutional law only to have a federal court discover, during a [habeas] proceeding, new
constitutional commands.” Id.
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IV. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS189
If one accepts the premise that death really is different, courts and
legislatures should then afford death row inmates the maximum amount
of constitutional protection. Thus, all new Supreme Court decisions that
modify our understanding of the Constitution and, in effect, change the
law should be applied retroactively to death row inmates. This Part will
first propose judicial action that could curtail erroneous executions.190
Next, this Part will propose an amendment to the AEDPA statutes.191
The amendment would allow an exception for habeas petitions arguing a
claim based on the retroactivity of a new Supreme Court decision for
death row inmates. The amendment to the statute will allow defendants
convicted of capital offenses to bypass the procedural hurdles of the
AEDPA so that death row inmates do not have to wait for the Supreme
Court to specifically hold a decision to be retroactive on a second or
successive habeas application.

189
As one famous jurist has recently noted, “[t]he theoretical uplands, where democratic
and judicial ideals are debated, tend to be arid and overgrazed; the empirical lowlands are
fertile but rarely cultivated.” RICHARD POSNER, LAW, PRAGMATISM, AND DEMOCRACY 3-4
(2003). Such is the nature of academic writing, and true to form, this article has stayed
mainly in the land of the overgrazed. Several comprehensive articles on the retroactivity
doctrine have already been written and different proposals to retroactivity in the death
penalty context have been proposed. See generally Marc M. Arkin, The Prisoner’s Dilemma:
Life in the Lower Federal Courts After Teague v. Lane, 69 N.C. L. REV. 371 (1991); John Blume
& William Pratt, Understanding Teague v. Lane, 18 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 325
(1990-91); Roger D. Branigin III, Sixth Amendment–The Evolution of the Supreme Court’s
Retroactivity Doctrine: A Futile Search for Theoretical Clarity, 80 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
1128 (1989); David R. Dow, Teague and Death: The Impact of Current Retroactivity Doctrine on
Capital Defendants, 19 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 23 (1991); Markus Dirk Dubber, Prudence and
Substance: How the Supreme Court’s New Habeas Retroactivity Doctrine Mirrors and Affects
Substantive Constitutional Law, 30 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1 (1992); Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel
J. Meltzer, New Law, Non-Retroactivity, and Constitutional Remedies, 104 HARV. L REV. 1733
(1991); Patrick E. Higginbotham, Notes on Teague, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 2433 (1993); Joseph L.
Hoffman, Retroactivity and the Great Writ: How Congress Should Respond to Teague v. Lane,
1990 BYU L. REV. 183 (1990); Eliot F. Krieger, Recent Development, The Court Declines in
Fairness–Teague v. Lane, 25 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 164 (1990); Daniel J. Meltzer, Habeas
Corpus Jurisdiction: The Limits of Models, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 2507 (1993); Linda Meyer,
“Nothing We Say Matters”: Teague and New Rules, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 423 (1994); Bryan A.
Stevenson, The Politics of Fear and Death: Successive Problems in Capital Federal Habeas Corpus
Cases, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 699 (2002); Larry W. Yackle, The Habeas Hagioscope, 66 S. CAL. L.
REV. 2331 (1993).
Perhaps the best solution would be to eliminate the death penalty. However, until the
government, and ultimately the public, agrees with this view there will be no way to
eliminate the possibility of a wrongful execution.
190
See infra Part IV.A.
191
See infra Part IV.B.
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A. Judicial Remedies Available
As long as federal courts review state court decisions for
constitutional infirmities, the policy concerns of federalism and comity
will still act as an obstruction to retroactivity. One solution would be to
have each state supreme court adopt a policy of reviewing cases on
collateral review first when an inmate makes a retroactivity challenge.192
The federalism and comity concerns that invade federal court decisions
are not present when a state reviews its own case.193 However, not all
states will want to place the extra burden on their judiciary to review
cases that are already final.194 Thus, a change in how federal courts
review habeas petitions based on retroactivity is necessary.
If the Supreme Court wants to maintain the substance-procedure
dichotomy in determining whether a change in law should be
retroactive, the Court should add a presumption that a change in the law
is substantive, and thus retroactive, when the penalty is death. It seems
simply illogical to allow a mere accident of timing to determine the
retroactive application of law. Justice is not done by making the arbitrary
distinction between applying a change in law consistently on direct
review and limiting the retroactive use of laws on collateral review. In
effect, an inmate is punished because the Supreme Court recognized its
error in constitutional thinking too late. Furthermore, many grounds for
reversal, such as ineffective assistance of counsel and improper
sentencing, are more properly brought on collateral review than on
direct review.195

Several state supreme courts have recognized that the requirements of Teague provide
for only the minimal constitutional requirements and have thus provided greater
protections than the Federal Constitution requires. See Ex parte Coker, 575 So.2d 43 (Ala.
1990); Saylor v. State, 808 N.E.2d 646 (Ind. 2004); State v. Whitfield, 107 S.W.3d 253 (Mo.
2003); Colwell v. State, 59 P.3d 463 (Nev. 2002); State v. Lark, 567 A.2d 197 (N.J. 1989);
Cowell v. Leapley, 458 N.W.2d 514 (S.D. 1990).
193
There are obviously no federalism or comity problems when a state reviews its own
case.
194
State v. Towery, 64 P.3d 828, 835 (Ariz. 2003) (“Conducting new sentencing hearings,
many requiring witnesses no longer available, would impose a substantial and unjustified
burden on Arizona’s administration of justice.”).
195
Generally, failure to raise a claim at trial or on direct appeal will result in waiver of the
claim. United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 162-66 (1982). However there are certain
constitutional claims that may only be adequately addressed on collateral attack. See
United States v. Casel, 995 F.2d 1299, 1307 (5th Cir. 1993) (holding ineffective assistance of
counsel claim cannot be raised on direct appeal unless it has been raised in the district
court and collateral review is the proper route for the claim); United States v. Booker, 981
F.2d 289, 292 (7th Cir. 1992) (holding that ineffective assistance of counsel claim is best
192
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The Supreme Court should also consider answering the
retroactivity question of a change in the law when it issues an opinion.
By simply stating that this change in law does or does not apply
retroactively, the Court would save resources and confusion for the
judiciary and for the prisoner population. Currently, the only way an
inmate can challenge his sentence based on the retroactive effect of a
change in law (Post-AEDPA and Tyler v. Cain) is to wait for the Supreme
Court to specifically hold that the change in the law should apply
retroactively. This requires approximately two years of wasteful
litigation before the issue ultimately winds back up on the Supreme
Court docket. To avoid this waste and delay the Supreme Court should
simply determine the retroactive effect of a change in law when it issues
an opinion.196
Ultimately, the best judicial solution would be to abandon the
Teague analysis completely. Instead of maintaining the archaic and
restricting Teague analysis, the Court should adopt a new policy of
retroactivity for death penalty cases. For capital cases, retroactivity must
again be “rethought.”197 Instead of asking the often times unanswerable
question of whether a change in the law is substantive or procedural, the
court should look at what effect the change in law will have on the
habeas petitioner. The court should ask the question: “Will the new
decision, as applied to the individual defendant, make a difference
beyond a harmless error in the overall merits of the case?” If so, that
applicant should have the opportunity to have his case reheard
regarding the appropriateness of the sentence. The finality of the
decision will be maintained as to the guilt of the accused, but a new
sentencing hearing will be given to the inmate. This way finality is only
partly disrupted because the individual may only have his sentence
reevaluated under the changing demands of Due Process. This would
avoid the risk of granting the “formerly guilty” a free ticket out of jail
based on a mere technicality.
In effect, this analysis would reinstate a modified version of the
Linkletter balancing test.198 A trial judge should determine whether to
brought under § 2255, not direct appeal); United States v. Tabares, 951 F.2d 405, 409 (1st
Cir. 1991) (holding ineffective assistance of counsel claim inappropriate on direct review
when issue required information beyond trial record).
196
Unfortunately, this policy is unlikely to be adopted by the Supreme Court based on
the Court’s reluctance to issue advisory opinions.
197
See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
198
To avoid the apparent inconsistent results that Linkletter produced, our notion that the
Supreme Court is binded by its own precedent would have to be altered. Most judges on
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rehear the case in light of the new change in the law or to dismiss the
case at the outset. The proposed remedy will remove the confusing and
unworkable substance-procedure distinction in a Teague analysis.
B. Proposed Amendment to the AEDPA
Perhaps the best long-term solution would be to include a death
penalty exception in the federal AEDPA statute. This exception would
remove the possibility of a death row inmate being executed before he
has the opportunity to have his decision reheard and would allow for the
uniform application of retroactivity in federal courts for death row
inmates.
The exception should be included in parts (b)(1) and (b)(2) of section
2244.199 Recall that § 2244 is the statute that determines the finality of the
decision. The two habeas statutes have almost identical language and
would also have to be altered; § 2255 is used when appealing a
conviction while in federal custody and § 2254 is used for appealing a
conviction while in state custody. The revised statute would read as
follows with the portions that are italicized being the new additions:
(b)(1) A claim presented in a second or successive
habeas corpus application under section 2254 that was
presented in a prior application shall be dismissed unless
the applicant was sentenced to death and is relying on a new
rule of constitutional law and further meets the procedural
requirements of part (b)(3) of this statute.
(2) A claim presented in a second or successive
habeas corpus application under section 2254 that was
not presented in a prior application shall be dismissed
unless—
(A) (i) the applicant shows that the claim relies on a
new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases
on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was
previously unavailable; or
the Supreme Court already seem to have accepted this view including one of the most
conservative Justices, Justice Thomas. See KEN FOSKETT, JUDGING THOMAS: THE LIFE AND
TIMES OF CLARENCE THOMAS 281 (1st ed. 2004). Foskett notes that Thomas is one of the
most willing current Supreme Court members to overrule precedent. Id. Quoting Justice
Scalia, “He [Justice Thomas] does not believe in stare decisis, period.” Id.
199
See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
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(ii) the applicant was sentenced to death and is relying on
a new rule of constitutional law and further meets the
procedural requirements of part (b)(3) of this statute; or
(B) (i) the factual predicate for the claim could not
have been discovered previously through the exercise of
due diligence; and
(ii) the facts underlying the claim, if proven and
viewed in light of the evidence as a whole, would be
sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence
that, but for constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder
would have found the applicant guilty of the underlying
offense.
(3)
(A) Before a second or successive application
permitted by this section is filed in the district court, the
applicant shall move in the appropriate court of appeals
for an order authorizing the district court to consider the
application.
(B) A motion in the court of appeals for an order
authorizing the district court to consider a second or
successive application shall be determined by a threejudge panel of the court of appeals.
(C) The court of appeals may authorize the filing of
a second or successive application only if it determines
that the application makes a prima facie showing that
the application satisfies the requirements of this
subsection.
(D) The court of appeals shall grant or deny the
authorization to file a second or successive application
not later than 30 days after the filing of the motion.
(E) The grant or denial of an authorization by a court
of appeals to file a second or successive application shall
not be appealable and shall not be the subject of a
petition for rehearing or for a writ of certiorari, unless the
denial is based on a new rule of constitutional law, in which
case the decision is appealable.
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Commentary:
A “new rule of constitutional law” means that the decision was not
final at the time the initial application was made. The statute would be
construed to afford previously convicted death penalty inmates the same
amount of protection as inmates that will eventually be convicted. This
is necessary in order to treat defendants equally. This statutory change
also recognizes that the death penalty is different from all other criminal
penalties. However, the change must be limited to those convicted of a
capital crime in order to ensure the continued expansion of civil liberties.
Due to the limited number of individuals on death row, the costs of
applying a case retroactively on collateral review will be minimal. Thus
expansions in the liberties of death row inmates should not be curtailed.
Unfortunately, the ideal solution of an amendment to the habeas
statutes is most likely the least attainable. Congress has a vested interest
in appearing to be “tough on crime.” It is unlikely, given the political
atmosphere in a post-9/11 world, that Congress would ever implement a
policy of reforming habeas to expand the right of inmates to challenge
the constitutionality of a sentence. Furthermore, there is also a strong
economic incentive in effectively eliminating habeas petitions from
federal courts. By limiting habeas petitions, Congress has loosened the
strain on an already overworked, underpaid federal judiciary. It is safe
to say that unless a habeas lobbying group reaches Congress, the only
real reform will be through the judiciary.
V. CONCLUSION
This Note has argued that when the penalty is death a different
standard of retroactivity should apply. Regrettably, there are no easy
answers in deciphering the problem of retroactivity. The common law
affords the easiest answer, but is admittedly unworkable as a solution
due to the great costs involved with applying every new law
retroactively. However, as this Note has shown, the costs are different
when faced with the possibility of an unconstitutional, or perhaps even
wrongful, execution. Congress and the Supreme Court have effectively
narrowed the scope of the retroactivity doctrine in collateral review cases
but have not accounted for the fact that death is fundamentally different
from all other penalties. This Note has proposed several judicial
remedies for applying a new case retroactively in death penalty cases
and has also proposed an amendment to the AEDPA statutes allowing
for a death penalty exception to the otherwise restrictive AEDPA
requirements. However, a death penalty exception to the AEDPA will
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be hard to come by and, cynically or not, we may just have to wait for
the vote of a new Supreme Court Justice.
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